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DEMOCRATIZATION AS A UNITED STATES STRATEGY FOR MIDDLE EAST SECURITY
Therefore, the United States has adopted a new policy, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East. This strategy requires the same persistence and energy and idealism we have shown before. And it will yield the same results. As in Europe, as in Asia, as in every region of the world, the advance of freedom leads to peace.
- no Middle Eastern country is considered democratic -most continue to exist under dictatorial, semi-authoritarian, or monarchical rule. Since September 11, 2001 , the United States has increasingly promoted democratization in the Middle East as a strategy for regional security and to reduce the threat of global terrorism emerging from the region. Is the current approach an effective strategy or is it merely the latest symbolic agenda doomed to failure in a part of the world that is impervious to such reform? Can democracy take root in the region and, if so, will it be an effective counterbalance to global terrorism? This paper will analyze the strategy of democratization, outline the challenges of pursing such a plan in the Middle East, and recommend ways and means to improve the United States' strategy for the region.
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
The goal of the United States' 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) is to make the world safer and better through political and economic reform. To achieve its objectives, the strategy advances the goals of open societies and the building of democratic infrastructure. 1 U.S. national objectives are: defending the nation against its enemies, creating of a balance of power that favors human freedom, and extending the hope of democracy and development to every corner of the world. 2 The objective in the Middle East is to defend the United States by promoting regional stability through an agenda of political, social/cultural, and economic reform.
Ways to achieve national objectives in the region include expanding trade, investment in entrepreneurial businesses, promotion of democratic institutions, education and expansion of the role of women in society, and development of global information technology. Since the publication of the 2002 National Security Strategy, the Bush administration has increasingly championed democratization as a strategy for Middle East security. In the administration's view, as long as the Middle East remains a place devoid of freedom, it will continue to breed instability, cultivate terrorism, and pose a direct threat to the security of the United States. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the approach toward reform was direct and unambiguous -regime change. In Afghanistan, the ruling Taliban party provided sanctuary for an international terrorist organization which perpetrated the September 11 attacks. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein's regime was judged to pose a threat to national security through continued violations of United Nations' Security Council resolutions, by suspected links to terrorist organizations, and by assumed (yet unproven) possession of weapons of mass destruction.
Free elections followed in both countries and provide examples that the administration hopes will become beacons of democracy for others in the region to follow. As President Bush remarked at a speech to the Army War College in 2003:
The rise of a free and self-governing Iraq will deny terrorists a base of operation, discredit their narrow ideology, and give momentum to reformers across the region. This will be a decisive blow to terrorism at the heart of its power, and a victory for the security of America and the civilized world.
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While their future is far from certain, it is difficult to argue that people were better off under the removed oppressive regimes of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan.
The Bush administration hopes that the sculpting of democracy in these two nations will encourage citizens of other repressed nations to rise up, decry tyranny and induct freely elected
governments.
DEMOCRACY
Before we analyze the strategy for democratization, it is useful to discuss the principles of democracy itself. Democracy is a system of government where the people hold sovereign power over the government. Certain principles and practices distinguish democratic government: power and civic responsibility exercised by all citizens; protection of human freedom; majority rule coupled with individual and minority rights; protection of basic human rights; free and fair elections; adherence to the rule of law; and a commitment to the values of tolerance, cooperation, and compromise. 6 While the Bush administration acknowledges that "F," "PF," and "NF," respectively, stand for "free," "partly free," and "not free."
"PR" stands for "political rights," "CL" stands for "civil liberties," and "Status" is the freedom status. criticism from media and human rights organizations. 15 In 1999, Yemen held its first ever presidential election followed by free parliamentary elections. However, the appearance of an open democratic process is misleading. Yemeni politics are fraught with corruption, dominated by the ruling party, and lack any checks and balances on executive authority. 16 Egypt has witnessed a growing chorus of demands for political change. In 2003, the government initiated a series of limited reforms: abolishing state security courts and hard-labor prison sentences; initiating a wide-ranging dialogue with legal opposition parties; and tolerating more open discussion of previously taboo topics. 17 Syria's firm control continues to be the greatest impediment to freedom in Lebanon. The Lebanese president is formally selected every six years by the 128-member parliament. In practice, however, this choice is made after Syrian authorization. Freedom of religion is guaranteed and protected in the Lebanese constitution.
The country's universities are the region's most open and vibrant. 18 These "partially-free" nations currently represent the best opportunity for a democratization strategy in the Middle
East. In other countries, the prospects are much less promising.
In recent years, Libya has sought to climb out of international isolationism through two At the same time, it has become increasingly clear that we must broaden our approach to the region if we are to achieve success. In particular, we must give sustained and energetic attention to economic, political, and educational reform. The spread of democracy and free markets, fueled by the wonders of the technological revolution, has created a dynamo that can generate prosperity and human well-being on an unprecedented scale. But this revolution has left much of the Middle East behind. 22 To achieve more enduring ways and means to economic, political and economic reform, the Bush administration has sponsored two initiatives aimed directly at advancing democratic expansion: the Millennium Challenge Account and the Broader Middle East Initiative.
In 2002, the United States established the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) to reward nations that "govern justly, invest in their people and encourage economic freedom". 23 The
MCA focuses on reducing poverty by promoting sustainable eco nomic growth. As a bilateral program, the MCA requires a high level commitment from recipient nations to develop shared objectives and guarantee civil society participation. In January 2004, President Bush signed the law creating the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), authorizing it to administer the MCA and providing $1 billion in initial funding for FY04. The administration has pledged to increase funding for the MCA to $5 billion a year starting in FY06, roughly a 50 percent increase over the current U.S. core development assistance. 24 While the MCA focuses primarily on economic aid to developing African nations, the program is clearly aimed at a larger agenda of political reform.
At a May 2004 MCA selection ceremony, President Bush remarked:
The powerful combination of trade and open markets and good government is history's proven method to defeat poverty on a large scale, to vastly improve health and education, to build a modern infrastructure while safeguarding the environment, and to spread the habits of liberty and enterprise. 25 The program's prerequisites for "just governance" have excluded most Middle East nations from participation. To date, only Morocco has qualified. Yemen has been designated as a "threshold" country having demonstrated a significant commitment to improve their performance with respect to the MCA eligibility criteria. 26 For the Middle East, the MCA presents a "chicken or the egg" dilemma. While it aims to build the foundations of democracyeconomic freedom, investment in society, and poverty reduction -it excludes unreformed nations. For the time being, the MCA appears beyond the reach of non-democratic Middle
Eastern countries and the program is not likely to entice widespread reform in the region.
At the June 2004 G-8 Summit, President Bush announced the Broader Middle East
Initiative (BMEI) as a pillar of the administration's strategy for economic, political, and educational development in the region. 27 The initiative commits "to a partnership for progress and a common future with the governments and peoples of the Broader Middle East and North
Africa." 28 The policy focuses on three areas. First, in the political sphere, the agenda seeks to promote democracy, the rule of law, human rights, fundamental freedoms, diversity and pluralism. Second, in the social and cultural sphere, it advances education, freedom of expression, equality between men and women, and access to global information technology as tools for modernization and prosperity. The final focus area, in the economic sphere, encourages entrepreneurship, expands trade and investment, and promotes transparency to combat corruption. Development to remove impediments to investment. 30 Armed with concrete strategies resulting from the Rabat conference, the Broader Middle
East Initiative program appears to have moved beyond the "bumper-sticker" phase and is now poised to undertake the crucial work of building the mechanisms of reform. Despite its good intentions and current traction however, the initiative still faces larger challenges toward producing the desired end state of a democratic Middle East. The second issue rests in the conflict between democracy and shura -the Islamic decision making process. In a representative democracy, officials are elected by popular ballot.
CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRATIZATION
RELIGION
Representatives make decisions and pass laws, in theory, based on consultation with and consensus from their population. Under Islamic law, the Quran provides two conflicting interpretations concerning consultative decision making -it may be obligatory or merely desirable. 32 In the more authoritarian regimes of the Middle East, traditional Islamic scholars and leaders do not endorse consultation as a prerequisite to validate executive decision making.
Many Muslim activists consider democracy to be the rule of humans as opposed to Islam, which is the rule of God. 33 Lastly, the question of individual freedoms is sometimes at odds with familiar democratic precepts. Many Islamists strongly reject articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which deal with equality of marriage rights and freedom to change one's religion or belief. They also object to the provisions on women's rights, questioning the equality of gender roles and obligations. Islam, they argue, prohibits the marriage of a Muslim woman to a non-Muslim man.
Apostasy is forbidden and is punishable by death. Arab political systems to popular choice would serve Western or their own security interests. 38 Some argue that the more popular Arab politics become, the more Islamic they will be -and it may spell the demise of democracy in the region. The Islamic revival reduces even further the likelihood of democratic development, particularly since democracy is often identified with the very Western influences the revival strongly opposes. 39 The continued emphasis on rote learning ill-prepares youth for jobs in the modern economy. It is not accidental that many Middle Eastern regimes fail to promote modern education as a well-educated and knowledgeable population is demanding and criticalqualities that are counter to the longevity of authoritarian rule. Illiteracy rates are higher than the international average and even higher than the average in developing countries. 42 Problems in quality and relevance have led to a significant mismatch between the developing needs of the labor market and the output of Arab education systems. 43 The Arab world has the highest unemployment rates in the world -ranging from 12% in the most developed countries to over 30% in Yemen and Syria. 44 The region lags behind the rest of the world in their acceptance and introduction of a global economy. As the gap widens, the resistance to reform seemingly grows as the inconsonance breeds resentment and a desire to return to Islamic authoritarianism.
At some point in the transition to democracy, an educated civil society must develop and play a role in influencing the political system. Many experts maintain that civil society frequently develops first, and is in fact the most important vehicle of reform. Civil society organizations tend to develop in response to an actual or perceived breakdown in the functions of the state and emerge chiefly to satisfy those needs and functions which the state has been unable or unwilling to deliver. 45 In Although it has made inroads toward education and women's rights, it has had no measurable effect on promoting political reform. The BMEI, with almost the exact same agenda, will likely suffer similar malaise unless it is better funded with an aid package tightly conditioned to measurable benchmarks of political reform.
DEMOCRATIZATION AS A STRATEGY TO COMBAT TERRORISM
The 2002 National Security Strategy affirms the importance of democracy to U.S.
objectives by stating:
…the national security strategy of the United States must start from these core beliefs and look outward for possibilities to expand liberty. We will use our foreign aid to promote freedom and support those who struggle non-violently for it, ensuring that nations moving toward democracy are rewarded for the steps they take. 
RECOMMENDATIONS
The United States' promotion of democracy in the Middle East will have to rely on more than a bumper sticker slogan of a "forward strategy of freedom." It is naive to believe that waves of democracy are advancing in the world and will ultimately break upon the shores of the Middle East. The challenge is how to stimulate reform in a region where authoritarianism rules.
Responding to this challenge will require a greater willingness to pressure authoritarian leaders who offer short-term economic and security benefits to the United States but spell long-term trouble. 55 If the Bush administration hopes to achieve the strategic end of extending the hope of democracy and development to the Middle East, it must strengthen programs like the Broader 
